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Summary
The United States has deployed long-range ballistic missiles as a part of its
strategic offensive nuclear forces for more than 40 years.  In recent years, analysts
both inside and outside the government have suggested that the United States deploy
conventional warheads on these missiles.  This would provide the United States with
the ability to strike promptly anywhere in the world, regardless of the presence of
overseas bases or nearby naval forces.
The United States could use medium or long-range aircraft or sea-based cruise
missiles or ballistic missiles to contribute to the prompt global strike (PGS) mission.
However, only long-range ballistic missiles have the range and prompt attack
capability needed to strike suddenly at the start of an unanticipated conflict.  The Air
Force and Navy have both studied the possible deployment of conventional warheads
on their long-range ballistic missiles.  The Navy sought funding, in FY2003 and
FY2004, for research into a reentry vehicle that would be able to maneuver when
approaching its target.  The FY2007 Defense Budget contains $100 million to pursue
the deployment of conventional warheads on Trident missiles.  The Air Force is
pursuing, with DARPA, research into a number of technologies that might enhance
the U.S. long-range strike capability.  In particular, it is developing a hypersonic glide
vehicle, known as the Common Aero Vehicle (CAV), that could carry conventional
munitions and be deployed on modified Minuteman II or Peacekeeper missiles.
Many have expressed concerns about the possibility that other nations, such as
Russia or China might misinterpret the launch of a conventionally-armed ballistic
missile and conclude that they are under attack with nuclear weapons.  The Air Force
has outlined a number of measures that might reduce this risk.  It plans to base these
missiles along the U.S. coast, far from bases with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.
It also would use consultations, notifications, and inspections to inform others of the
difference between conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles.  But, although these
measures could address some of the concerns, they are not likely to eliminate the
risks of misunderstandings, particularly if the United States used these missiles on
short notice in a crisis.  The Navy has not outlined any similar measures, and could
deploy conventional warheads on submarines that also carry nuclear warheads.
Long-range ballistic missiles can bring unique capabilities to the PGS mission.
But these missiles are only uniquely capable if the United States must attack
promptly, or within hours, of the start of an unanticipated conflict.  In any other
circumstance, the United States is likely to have the time to move its forces into the
region.  Hence, when deciding to fund the development of conventional warheads for
long-range land-based or sea-based missiles, and whether to deploy conventional
ICBMs, Congress may review whether the benefits brought by these systems
outweigh the risks of misunderstandings arising from their use.
This report will be updated as needed.
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Conventional Warheads For Ballistic
Missiles: Background and Issues
Introduction
The United States began to deploy long-range ballistic missiles in the late 1950s
and early 1960s.  These missiles — land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) and sea-based submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) — have
served as the backbone of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent for more than 40 years.
They provided the United States with the ability to threaten targets throughout the
Soviet Union, and, if necessary, in other nations, from the United States or from
submarines patrolling at sea.  When the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, these
missiles carried more than 8,000 nuclear warheads.  The United States has reduced
its strategic forces during the past 15 years, but it still has approximately 4,868
warheads deployed on 982 ICBMs and SLBMs.1  All the missiles still carry nuclear
warheads.
In recent years, analysts both inside and outside the government have suggested
that the United States consider deploying conventional warheads on its long-range
ballistic missiles.  The Bush Administration, in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review,
called for the integration of precision conventional weapons with strategic nuclear
forces in a new category of “offensive strike” weapons.2 Ballistic missiles armed with
conventional warheads are one possible option for a new type of precision
conventional weapon.  In addition, the Pentagon has identified a new mission —
prompt global strike (PGS) — that would allow the United States to strike targets
anywhere on earth in a matter of hours, without relying on forward based forces.
Many analysts believe that long-range ballistic missiles armed with conventional
warheads would also be an ideal weapon for this mission.
Both the Navy and Air Force have studied concepts and technologies that might
allow the deployment of conventional warheads on long-range ballistic missiles.  The
Administration has requested funding for these initiatives for the past few years.
These requests have thus far received a mixed  reception in Congress.  But the
programs remained in the budget for FY2006, and, in FY2007, the Navy has
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requested $100 million to begin deploying conventional warheads on the Trident
submarine-launched ballistic missiles.  As a result, Congress is likely to continue to
review these programs, assessing both the Administration’s rationale for them and
the potential benefits and risks of pursuing them, as it considers whether DOD should
fund the development of conventional warheads for long-range ballistic missiles.
This report provides an overview of the Administration’s rationale for the
possible deployment of conventional warheads on long-range ballistic missiles.  It
then reviews the Air Force, and, to a lesser extent, Navy efforts to develop these
systems.  It summarizes congressional reaction to these proposals, then provides a
more detailed account of the issues raised by these concepts and programs.
Background
Conventional Ballistic Missiles and Offensive Strike Forces
The Bush Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released in early
January 2002, calls for the deployment of a “new triad” of capabilities that would
contribute to deterrence and U.S. national security in the coming years.3  During the
Cold War, the United States deployed a “triad” of forces comprised of the three types
of delivery vehicles for strategic nuclear weapons — land-based intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-
range bombers.  In the “new triad,” these nuclear-armed delivery vehicles would
combine with precision-guided conventional weapons and become known as
“offensive strike” forces.4
In the Administration’s view, offensive strike weapons with conventional
warheads could address some missions now assigned to long-range nuclear forces.
While some critics claim that this concept would blur the distinction between
conventional and nuclear weapons and increase the likelihood of a U.S. use of
nuclear weapons, the Administration has argued that the availability of precision
conventional weapons would, possibly, provide the President with more options in
a crisis, and, therefore, reduce the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons.  In
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in April 2005, General
James Cartwright, the commander of STRATCOM, noted that “the New Triad
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Testimony of Admiral James E. Cartwright, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.
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6 The war plan that outlines options for the use of nuclear weapons was known as the SIOP
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concept will enable more precisely tailored global strike operations.”5  Furthermore,
some have argued that, by replacing some nuclear weapons with conventional
weapons in the U.S. strategic war plan6 the United States might be able to further
reduce its number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons.7
General Cartwright and others have asserted that the substitution of
conventional warheads for nuclear warheads in the U.S. war plan would require
significant improvements in the accuracy of U.S. long-range ballistic missiles.  If
missiles can deliver their payloads more precisely to their targets, then, for some
categories of targets, they may not need the explosive yield of a nuclear weapon to
destroy the target.  General Cartwright has sought a study that will allow him to
determine what proportion of the targets in the U.S. war plan could be attacked with
conventional weapons.  An industry analyst has estimated that his proportion could
be between10% and 30% of the existing targets.8  Both the Navy and the Air Force
are exploring advanced guidance and targeting technologies, such as the use of GPS
guidance, that might provide their missiles with these improvements in accuracy.
This effort has been underway for more than a decade.
Conventional Ballistic Missiles and Prompt Global Strike
The Prompt Global Strike Mission (PGS).  Throughout the Cold War, the
United States maintained military bases overseas so that it could position its troops
to deter, and if necessary, respond promptly to an attack from the Soviet Union or its
allies.  These forward bases were located, for the most part, in Europe and Asia —
regions where conflict seemed most likely to occur.  These overseas bases and forces
were believed to not only increase preparedness, but also deter conflict by their very
presence in unstable regions.  However, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the
end of the Cold War, analysts argue that the United States must now be prepared to
fight a wider range of potential adversaries in unexpected areas who may possess a
great variety of military capabilities.  And, although the United States continues to
deploy its military forces at bases around the world, it can no longer be certain that
these bases will be located close to the theater of operations if a conflict occurs.  As
a result, the United States not only plans to restructure, and, in some cases, reduce,
its forces based overseas, it has also sought to improve its ability to move military
forces into a region quickly when and if a conflict occurs.  
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At the same time, many analysts and military officials have argued that the
United States must maintain and enhance its long-range strike capability so that it
can strike anywhere in the world with forces based in or near the United States.9  This
would not only allow the United States to pursue an adversary without relying on
forward bases, it would also allow the United States to reach targets deep inside an
enemy’s territory.  Further, some argue that the United States must be able to attack
targets, across the globe, in a matter of hours, or less, either at the start of a conflict
or during ongoing operations.  This is because, as some have argued, U.S. adversaries
could to adapt to the U.S. precision-strike capability by withholding targeting
information with concealment techniques or mobility, leaving the United States with
little time to attack after it identified relevant targets.  Finally, many have noted that
adversaries could seek to protect their assets by deploying them in buried or hardened
facilities, leading to a requirement for improvements in the U.S. ability to defeat
hardened and deeply buried targets.
The need for prompt long-range, or global, strike capabilities has been addressed
both in more general defense policy studies, such as the 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review, which noted that the U.S. defense strategy “rests on the assumption that U.S.
forces have the ability to project power worldwide,” and also in more specific service
reports on Air Force doctrine, which have noted that “rapid power projection based
in the continental United States has become the predominant military strategy.”  In
May 2003, the Air Force issued a formal Mission Need Statement for the Prompt
Global Strike (PGS) Mission.  This document was written by Air Force Space
command, coordinated with officials in the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, and validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).
This statement indicates that the United States needs to be able to strike globally and
rapidly with joint conventional forces against high-payoff targets.  The United States
should be able to plan and execute these attacks in a matter of minutes or hours, as
opposed to the days or weeks needed for planning and execution with existing forces,
and it should be able to execute these attacks even when it had no permanent military
presence in the region where the conflict would occur.10
PGS and the New U.S. Strategic Command.  In October 2002, the U.S.
Strategic Command (STRATCOM), which was in charge of plans and operations for
U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, merged with U.S. Space Command (SpaceCom),
which commanded military space operations, information operations, computer
network operations, and space campaign planning.11  This merger gave the new
STRATCOM the “ability to project power around the globe through space and
information warfare.”  Further, in late 2002 and early 2003, the Pentagon restructured
the new STRATCOM so that it could take on new missions, including the planning
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and execution of the prompt global strike mission.12  This change in the command
structure highlights a growing emphasis on long-range, strategic missions in
conventional warfighting doctrine.
Admiral James O. Ellis, the first Commander of the new STRATCOM, stated
that the new mission “extends our long-standing and globally-focused deterrent
capabilities to the broader spectrum of conflict.”  He further indicated that “the
incorporation of conventional, non-kinetic13, and special operations capabilities into
a full-spectrum contingency arsenal will enable the command to deliberately and
adaptively plan for and deliver rapid, limited-duration, extended-range combat
power anywhere in the world (emphasis added).”  This will “provide a wider range
of options to the President in responding to time-critical global challenges.”  He also
stated that STRATCOM’s capabilities would “provide the nation an immediate
ability to engage a select set of targets by moving rapidly from actionable
intelligence, through adaptive planning, to national-level decision-making and the
delivery of effects across thousands of miles.”14  He stated that data-gathering,
decision-making, and execution must occur in minutes to support the PGS mission,
a standard that is not yet possible with existing technology.
General James Cartwright, the current commander of STRATCOM, defined the
global strike mission area by stating that “it provides to the nation the ability to
rapidly plan and rapidly deliver effect any place on the globe...”  The capability
would not necessarily be nuclear, and  a regional combatant commander could “tailor
it for his target and deliver it very quickly, with very short time lines on the planning
and delivery, any place on the face of the Earth.”  General Cartwright also
emphasized that the global strike capability involved much more than just the
delivery of a weapon to a target, stating that “it encompasses both the ability to plan
rapidly, to apply the precision to the intelligence and gather that intelligence in a very
rapid manner, and then to apply that intelligence to the target and understand the
effect we want to create.”15  The U.S. military is seeking to acquire the capabilities
needed to meet this standard.
Potential Targets and Weapons for the PGS Mission.  The United
States might need to strike several categories of targets promptly, throughout the
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spectrum of conflict.  For example, if an adversary deployed air defense or anti-
satellite weapons that could disrupt the U.S. ability to sustain an attack, the United
States might choose to strike promptly at the start of a conflict with weapons that
could penetrate and destroy the defenses.  A prompt strike against an adversary’s
ballistic missiles or caches of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) might allow the
United States to destroy these weapons early before an adversary could use them.
Some targets could also appear quickly and remain vulnerable for short periods of
time during a conflict.  These might include leadership cells that could move during
a conflict or mobile military systems that the adversary had chosen to keep hidden
prior too their use.
The United States might use a number of different weapons systems, in the near
term, in the PGS mission.16  These could include medium- or long-range aircraft,
cruise missiles launched from bombers or submarines, and ballistic missiles based
at sea or on land in the United States.17  But conventional aircraft, even if they are
based near the theater of operations,  could take several hours, or more, to reach their
targets.  Aircraft may also be vulnerable to enemy air defenses, particularly if they
tried to attack targets deep inside enemy territory.  Similarly, aircraft or cruise
missiles based at sea may be too far from the theater of operations to strike critical
targets in a timely manner.
Officials in the Air Force and at the Pentagon, and some analysts outside
government believe that the United States could achieve the prompt global strike
mission with its long-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs).18  The Pentagon’s
Defense Science Board (DSB), in a study published in early 2004, asserted that land-
based long-range ballistic missiles have “unique, time-critical characteristics” that
include “responsiveness, range, speed, precision, lethality, and freedom of
maneuver.”19 With these capabilities, they could attack targets anywhere in the world
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within an hour of their launch, without relying on forward bases or supporting
military capabilities, such as the tanker aircraft needed to support long-range flights
by bombers.  They would not be at risk from air defenses, and there would be no risk
to flight crews.  Further, if  the warheads could maneuver to slow their reentry and
increase their angle of attack, they might be effective against some types of hardened
and deeply buried targets.  The DSB study asserted that these weapons could provide
“a reliable, low-cost force on continuous alert with a high readiness rate and the
capability to immediately react under strict control of the National Command
Authority.”  In other words, the high levels of reliability, readiness, and command
and control that were needed as a part of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent during
the Cold War are also valuable characteristics for a long-range conventional strike
system in the post-Cold War era.
However, because U.S. long-range ballistic missiles have always carried nuclear
warheads, potential adversaries might misunderstand U.S. intentions if the United
States employed ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads, possibly
deciding, when they detect a launch, that they are under nuclear attack from the
United States.  Accordingly, the Air Force has sought to develop a concept of
operations for conventional ballistic missiles, discussed later, that addresses these
concerns in an effort to mitigate the risks. 
Plans and Programs
Both the Navy and the Air Force have studied the possible deployment of
conventional warheads on their long-range ballistic missiles.  The Air Force briefly
studied the penetration capabilities of conventional ICBMs in the mid-1990s.  In
August 1995 it launched an ICBM armed with a “pointy” front end (and no explosive
warhead) against a granite slab that had characteristics similar to reinforced concrete.
Press reports indicate that the warhead entered the target at a 90 degree angle and
penetrated to a depth of 30 feet, which is  greater than the depth of penetration of any
existing U.S. weapon.20 The Navy also sponsored studies in the 1990s that sought to
develop a non-nuclear penetrating warhead for the Trident SLBM.  These studies also
focused on questions about whether a reentry vehicle from a ballistic missile could
penetrate a hardened target, using only its speed and angle of reentry, without a
nuclear explosion.  Both the Navy and the Air Force recognized that, without a
nuclear explosion, the reentry vehicle from a ballistic missile would have to be far
more accurate than those deployed in the 1990s (and still deployed today) to attack
and destroy a buried target.
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Navy Programs
In FY2003, the Navy requested funding for research on a new type of reentry
vehicle that could significantly improve the accuracy of the Trident II (D-5) missiles.
This program, known as the Enhanced Effectiveness (E2) Initiative, included an
initial funding request of $30 million, a three-year study, and a full-scale flight test
in early 2007.21  Congress rejected the initial funding request in FY2003 and FY2004,
but Lockheed Martin Corporation, the contractor pursuing the study, has continued
with a low level of research into this system.
 The E2 reentry vehicle would integrate the existing inertial measurement unit
(IMU) guidance system (the system currently used to guide long-range ballistic
missiles) with global positioning system (GPS) technologies so that the reentry
vehicle could receive guidance updates during its flight.22  A standard MK4 reentry
vehicle, which is the reentry vehicle deployed on many Trident SLBMs, would be
modified with steering system, allowing it to maneuver when approaching its target
to improve its accuracy and increase its angle of penetration.  This steering system,
which the Navy has referred to as a “backpack extension,” would increase the size
of the reentry vehicle, making it comparable in size to the MK5 reentry vehicle that
is also deployed on Trident missiles.  The E2 warhead could possibly provide Trident
missiles with the accuracy to strike within 10 meters of their intended, stationary,
targets.  This accuracy would not only improve the lethality of the nuclear warheads
but it would also permit the missiles to destroy some types of targets with
conventional warheads.23 
Lockheed Martin, has flown two reentry vehicles in test flights of Trident
missiles.24  In a test conducted in 2002, it demonstrated that the new reentry vehicle
could steer towards a target and strike with improved accuracy.  In a test conducted
in early 2005, a modified version of its reentry vehicle demonstrated that it could not
only steer towards a target with improved accuracy, but also slow down and “control
the impact conditions,” capabilities that would be needed for the delivery of some
types of conventional warheads to their targets.  Lockheed estimates that, if the
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program received funding from Congress beginning in FY2006, its reentry vehicle
could enter production in FY2010 and achieve an initial operational capability in
2011.  The Navy, however, did not seek funding for this program in FY2004, 2005,
or 2006.
The Navy has included funding for a conventional warhead for Trident in its
budget request for FY2007.  Press reports indicate that the request includes a total of
$500 million over 5 years, with $125 million for FY2007, $225 million for FY2008,
$120 million for FY2009 and $30 million for FY2010.25  The same report indicates
that the Navy may seek to reprogram $100 million in the FY2006 budget to get and
“early start” on the effort to equip Trident missiles with conventional warheads.
Although the Navy has not spoken publicly about its plans for these warheads, the
press reports indicate that the Navy could deploy each of its 12 Trident submarines
on patrol (2 would be in overhaul at any given time) with 2 missiles equipped to carry
4 conventional warheads each.  The remaining 22 missiles on each submarine would
continue to carry nuclear warheads, and the submarines would continue to patrol in
areas that would allow them to reach targets specified in the nuclear war plan.  In
addition, only four submarines would be within range of their targets, with two in the
Pacific Ocean and two in the Atlantic ocean.  Consequently, only eight conventional
missiles would be available for use at any time, and only one or two of the
submarines are likely to be within range of the targets specified for attack with
conventional ballistic missiles.26  
These warheads would provide the Navy with the ability to contribute to the
prompt global strike mission in the near term, a goal that  was identified in the 2006
QDR.  The report indicated that the Navy would seek to deploy an “initial capability
to deliver precision-guided conventional warheads using long-range Trident” missiles
within two years,27 although many expect it to take four years to field the full
complement of 96 warheads. 
Air Force Programs
The Air Force is pursuing two initiatives related to the deployment of
conventional warheads on long-range ballistic missiles.  The first of these is known
as FALCON (Force Application and Launch From Conus [Continental United
States]), a joint Air Force/DARPA demonstration that is developing, among other
things, both near-term and far-term capabilities for the prompt global strike
missions.28  The second is an Air Force Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) study that
is to review technologies and programs that could meet the requirements of the
prompt global strike mission.
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The Air Force has outlined a notional architecture for a force of ballistic
missiles armed with conventional warheads.  It has determined that these missiles
could be deployed “on mobile launchers or in semi-buried silos or berms on each
coast, ready to launch on short notice.”29  The two potential bases include
Vandenberg Air Force Base on the West Coast and Cape Canaveral on the East
Coast. 
Missile Options.  Although it could build a new missile in the future, the Air
Force has indicated that it could modify both Minuteman II missiles and Peacekeeper
(MX) missiles to carry conventional warheads in the near term.  The Minuteman II
missile was first deployed in 1965 and was retired in the early 1990s.  The Air Force
deployed 450 of these missiles.  Each carried a single nuclear warhead and had a
range of over 7,000 miles.  The Air Force has already modified some of these
missiles, using five as target vehicles in tests of missile defense technologies and a
few in a space-launch configuration.  The Peacekeeper missile was first deployed in
1986; the Air Force began to deactivate these missiles in October 2002 and is to
complete the process by the end of FY2005.  The Air Force deployed 50 of these
missiles; each carried 10 warheads and had a range greater than 6,000 miles.
The Air Force has designated these modified missiles as the Minotaur II and
Minotaur III missiles.  It has stated that the modifications can be made at a relatively
low cost and low level of technical risk.  They would use the missiles’ existing rocket
motors.  The avionics and guidance systems could rely, primarily, on existing
technologies, with some modifications to allow the upper stages of the missiles and
their reentry vehicles to maneuver for improved accuracy.  Although the estimates
are preliminary, the Air Force believes that it could deploy a small number of these
missiles in under two years, at a total cost, for the development, integration, and
testing needed to modify the missiles, of around $31 million. This does not include
the costs any new warheads or weapons packages that would be deployed on the
missiles.
Warhead Options.  The modified Minuteman II missiles might each be able
to carry a single warhead that weighed between 500 and 1,000 pounds; a modified
Peacekeeper could possibly carry between 6,000 and 8,000 pounds of payload, which
would allow for multiple warheads or reentry vehicles.30  According to some
estimates, these missiles could even destroy some targets without an explosive
warhead, using the “sheer force of impact of a reentry vehicle moving at 14,000 feet
per second.”31  They could also carry a single conventional warhead with a reentry
body that had been modified to improve accuracy by allowing for the
maneuverability of the warhead, like the E2 warhead the Navy has considered.
Reports indicate that the Air Force is also considering deploying some of these
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missiles with specialized warheads that could be designed to destroy selected
categories of targets. 
One of the leading options for a reentry package, and a central focus of the
FALCON study noted above, is the proposed Common Aero Vehicle (CAV).32  The
CAV is to be an unpowered, maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicle capable of
carrying approximately 1,000 pounds in munitions or other payload.  According to
the Air Force, these payloads might include a “fuzed penetrator” warhead that would
hit its targets with impact speeds of approximately 4,000 feet per second.  With this
high impact speed, the CAV  should be able to attack and destroy some types of
hardened or buried targets.  The CAV could also carry several small smart bombs to
destroy facilities and infrastructure above ground, wide area autonomous search
munitions (WAASM) to destroy dispersed targets, and unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) that could gather intelligence in the target area. 
System Characteristics.  The FALCON study indicates that the proposed
CAV, based on a modified ICBM or other launch vehicle, should be able to travel at
5 times the speed of sound (Mach 5) so that it can deliver a substantial payload from
the continental United States to anywhere in on Earth in less than two hours.33 The
study has identified a number of objectives for the CAV system, in addition to the
possible range of munitions loadings, that would allow it to achieve these goals.  For
example, to meet the “prompt” needs of the mission, the CAV and its delivery
vehicle should achieve alert status, which would make it ready to launch, in under 24
hours.  Further, it should then be able to launch from this alert status in less than 2
hours, once it has received an execution order.  It should then be able to reach its
target within one hour of its launch.34  These characteristics would provide it with the
capabilities needed to attack time-sensitive targets.35
To meet the “global” portion of the PGS mission, the CAV should not only have
the range to “strike throughout the depth of an adversary’s territory,” it should also
have a cross-range capability of 3,000 nautical miles.  The cross range measures the
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ability of the CAV to maneuver and vary from a standard ballistic trajectory after  its
release from its launch vehicle.  This ability to maneuver would allow the CAV to
adjust to new information so that it could attack mobile targets, if timely and accurate
information became available and were communicated to the CAV during its flight.
Further, it would provide the CAV with a high degree of accuracy, allowing it to
deliver its weapons within a planned 3 meters of the intended target.  The CAV
would also have to be linked to “complete, timely intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance information.” 
Consequently, the ability of a missile armed with a CAV, or one armed with a
single conventional warhead, to deliver its weapons to targets across the globe within
hours of a decision to launch an attack presumes several interrelated capabilities.
The United States would need the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) capability that would allow it to identify a target precisely and quickly.  It
would also need the command and control capability to review the targets, plan the
attack, target the CAV vehicles, and order the launch within a short amount of time.
Finally, it would need the continuing reconnaissance capability to verify that the
intended target remained available and that the CAV reached and destroyed that
target.  The requirements would exist for both land-based and sea-based missiles.
Legislative Activity
Congress first considered the Administration’s plans to develop conventional
warheads for possible deployment on long-range ballistic missiles in FY2003.  Since
then, it has demonstrated some support, and some skepticism, about the plans. 
FY2003 and FY2004. As was noted above, the Navy requested $30 million
for its E2 program in FY2003 and FY2004.  In each case, this was to be the initial
year of funding in a three-year study.  Congress refused the Navy’s request in both
years; the Navy has not requested additional funds for research and development on
conventional warheads for SLBMs in subsequent years.
The Bush Administration requested $12.2 million in research and development
funding for  the CAV program in FY2004.  The House, in its version of H.R. 1588,
the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Bill, nearly doubled the authorized
funding to $24.2 million.  The Senate provided the requested amount, and the
Conference Committee split the difference, authorizing $17.025 million.  Although
Congress supported the Administration’s request for funding, the House had shown
concerns about the possibility that U.S. launches of ballistic missiles armed with
conventional warheads could be misinterpreted as non-conventional launches by
nations who might monitor U.S. military activity, a concern, particularly, to Russia
and China.  Hence, the House required that the Air Force submit a report on the
concept of operations for the CAV that would address questions about the potential
for misinterpretation of the launches.  This reporting requirement remained in the
final version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (P.L.
108-136).
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, (P.L. 108-136,
Sec. 1032) also contains a requirement for an annual report describing “an integrated
plan for developing, deploying, and sustaining a prompt global strike capability.”
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Congress mandated that the plan should include information on, among other things,
the types of targets for long-range strike assets, the capabilities desired for these
assets, an assessment of the command and control, intelligence, and surveillance
capabilities necessary to support the PGS mission, integration with tactical missions,
and cost and schedule for achieving the mission.  In the Conference report
(H.Rpt.108-354),  Congress noted that its interest in these issues derived from the
Nuclear Posture Review and its focus on integrating nuclear and conventional strike
capabilities to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons.  It indicated that it saw a need for
further analysis of future system requirements, along with a comprehensive effort to
link planning and programs in a PGS roadmap to achieve a coherent force structure.
Hence, although the Air Force considers the NPR objective of integrating nuclear and
conventional strike forces as a separate mission and separate concept from PGS,
Congress, initially at least, blended both into the request for a new report. 
The Air Force submitted its report on the CAV concept of operations to
Congress in February 2004.  This report offered several suggestions for measures the
United States could take to reduce the possibility of misinterpretation if the United
States were to deploy, and employ, ballistic missiles with conventional warheads.
Many of the measures discussed in this report are reviewed below, under “Issues for
Congress.”
FY2005.  The Bush Administration requested $16.4 million for research and
development on the CAV in FY2005.  Congress again increased this funding level,
appropriating $21.6 million for the development of the CAV.  However, in July
2004, with passage of the FY2005 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 4613, P.L. 108-
287), Congress repeated its concerns about the potential for  misinterpretation.  In the
report on the Defense Appropriations Bill, Congress questioned whether there were
safeguards in place to guarantee that other nuclear weapons states did not
misinterpret the intent or use of ballistic missiles armed with CAV.  In response to
these concerns, the report states that funds provided for CAV could only be used for
non-weapons related research on hypersonic technologies, including studies into
microsatellites or other satellite launch requirements.  Congress specified that the
funds could not be used to “develop, integrate, or test a CAV variant that includes
any nuclear or conventional weapons.”  Congress also indicated that  the funds could
not be used to “develop, integrate, or test a CAV for launch on any ICBM or SLBM.”
Congress would consider expanding the scope of this program in future years if
safeguards negotiated among international partners were put into place.36
FY2006.  The Bush Administration requested $27.2 million for CAV in
FY2006.  In response to the restrictions in the FY2005 Defense Appropriations Act,
it restructured the program, and redesignated the CAV as the Hypersonic Technology
Vehicle.  This new program excludes any development of weapons capabilities for
the CAV.  Congress has apparently approved this funding in the FY2006 Defense
Appropriations Act and has not imposed any new restrictions.
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The budget projections in the FY2006 budget request demonstrate how costs
could increase if the Air Force continues to pursue the CAV program.  The budget
requests are projected to be between $31 and $39 million each year for the next three
years, but they are then projected to rise to $92 million in FY2010 and $94 million
in FY2011.  This sharp increase reflects an expected change in the program from
research and development to production and deployment at the end of the decade.
This change would require that the Air Force address and resolve congressional
concerns about the potential for misunderstandings with the launch of ballistic
missiles armed with conventional warheads.
Issues for Congress
During the past few years, when reviewing Administration’s request for funding
for these programs, Congress has focused, primarily, on questions about the potential
that misunderstandings might arise if the United States were to launch long-range
missiles during crises or conflicts.  Stepping back from the specific programs,
however, Congress could review the rationales offered by the NPR and PGS mission
to determine whether the threats and capabilities faced by the United States justify
the pursuit of these programs.  It might also review whether other military programs
and capabilities can satisfy the emerging requirements, without raising many of the
questions about the potential for misunderstandings associated with the deployment
of conventional warheads on ballistic missiles.  Further, Congress could review the
Air Force proposals for addressing the issues raised by the deployment of CAV or
other conventional warheads on ICBMs and the more recent proposals to meet the
PGS mission need with the near-term deployment of conventional warheads on
Trident missiles.  Finally, U.S. obligations under the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START) could impinge plans for the deployment of long-range ballistic
missiles with conventional warheads.
Assessing the Rationale
The Nuclear Posture Review.  Those who believe that conventional ICBMs
might contribute to this mission argue that, with improvements in accuracy,
conventional warheads could substitute for nuclear warheads in attacking some sites
now targeted by nuclear weapons.  The Bush Administration and some analysts have
argued that this would provide the President with a wider range of options during a
crisis and, therefore, reduce the likelihood that he would have to use a nuclear
weapon.  Some have questioned, however, whether the President needs more options
or flexibility.  Nuclear weapons have always been reserved for the most extreme
circumstances, serving particularly as a deterrent against nuclear attack from other
nations with nuclear weapons.  In less extreme circumstances, the President has never
lacked for conventional options, they say, as is evidenced by the fact that the United
States has not used nuclear weapons since 1945.  
Many analysts have also argued that the Bush Administration’s formula for
integrating conventional and nuclear capabilities into an “offensive strike” force
could actually increase the likelihood of nuclear war by blurring the distinction
between nuclear and conventional weapons.  This new capability could allow the
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President to respond with conventional strikes against some types of targets, but it
is not clear that the adversary would know that the incoming weapons carried
conventional warheads.  It is also not clear that the United States would be able to
control the adversary’s reaction or the  escalation of the conflict, particularly if the
adversary possessed nuclear weapons.  Hence, by making the start of the war “easier”
the deployment of conventional warheads on ballistic missiles might, in this view,
actually make the eventual use of nuclear weapons more likely.
PGS.  The PGS mission’s requirements are based on the assumption that a
future conflict would take place far from existing U.S. bases overseas, and possibly
far from ocean areas where U.S. sea-based forces patrol.  They also assume that a
future conflict could develop quickly, allowing too little time for the United States
to move its forces into the region, either by acquiring basing rights on land or by
moving sea-based forces closer to the theater of conflict.  Further, the concern about
hidden or relocatable targets reflects an assumption that targets could appear with
little notice and remain vulnerable for a short period of time, factors that place a
premium on the ability to launch quickly and arrive on target quickly.  The
requirements also assume that U.S. forces are likely to face an “anti-access” threat,
or air defense capabilities that would impede operations by U.S. aircraft.
Many of these characteristics were present in Afghanistan in 2001, when the
United States attacked al Qaeda training camps and the Taliban government after the
September 11 terrorist attacks.  The attacks on the United States came without
warning, and, although the United States took several weeks to plan its response and
acquire the needed intelligence information on target areas, speed was of the essence
if the United States hoped to trap and destroy leaders at the training camps in
Afghanistan.  The United States had no military bases in the region, and had to take
the time to acquire basing rights in nearby nations and to move U.S. naval forces into
the region.  Further, the mountainous terrain offered the enemy areas, deep within the
country, where it could conceal its leadership and hope to evade attack.
These characteristics, with the premium they place on prompt, long-range
attacks, support the view that the United States should deploy long-range ballistic
missiles with conventional warheads for the PGS Mission.  In this view, other
weapons systems cannot address all the characteristics at the same time; bombers
may be too slow to arrive and too vulnerable to air defense systems, sea-based or air-
launched cruise missiles may also be too slow too arrive and of too short a range to
reach remote targets, and sea-based systems may also be too far away to reach high
priority targets promptly at the sudden start of a conflict.
However,  the presence of many of these characteristics in one recent conflict
does not necessarily mean that they will all be present in most, or even many, future
conflicts.  While each is certainly possible, taken together, these characteristics
describe a worst-case scenario that may occur rarely, or not at all, in its entirety.  This
observation highlights several questions that Congress could consider when
reviewing the rationale for the PGS mission.  How likely is it that the United States
would face a sudden, unanticipated conflict, with no time to build up its forces in the
region and with the requirement to strike some targets within hours of the start of the
conflict?  Would a delay of several hours or even days undermine the value of
attacking these targets at the start of a conflict?  Could other weapons systems
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provide the United States with the ability to “loiter” near the theater of operations,
allowing a prompt attack during the conflict if hidden or concealed targets are
revealed?37  A comparison of the likelihood of those scenarios that may provide the
most stressing environments with the likelihood of less stressful scenarios may lead
to the conclusion that other weapons systems can respond to many of these
requirements in most circumstances.
Reviewing the Alternatives
Land-Based Ballistic Missiles.  Long-range land-based ballistic missiles
armed with conventional warheads would likely possess many of the operational
strengths associated with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.  They would have
extremely high rates of readiness and reliability, allowing military planners to expect
more than 90% of the missiles to be available for use at any given time; they could
to respond promptly after a decision to launch; and they have high degree of accuracy
allowing for attacks across a wide range of targets.  Consequently, these systems
would “free the U.S. military from reliance on forward basing and enable it to react
promptly and decisively to destabilizing or threatening actions by hostile countries
and terrorist organizations.”38  They would allow the United States to “hold adversary
vital interests at risk at all times, counter anti-access threats, serve as a halt phase
shock force, and conduct suppression of enemy air defense and lethal strike
missions.”  Further, they address the need to “defeat time-critical, high value, and
hardened and deeply buried targets.”39  In other words, these weapons would address
all the potential circumstances cited in requirements for the PGS mission.
But the resemblance to nuclear-armed ballistic missiles would also raise
questions and create concerns.  If the United States were to launch them during a
conflict, nations with minimal launch notification systems (such as China) or
degraded launch notification systems (such as Russia)  could conclude that they were
under attack with nuclear missiles.40  Further, because many possible targets lie south
of Russia and China, and the United States has historically planned to launch its
ballistic missiles over the North Pole, a conventionally-armed long-range ballistic
missile would likely fly over these to nations to strike its targets.  For many minutes
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during their flight patterns, these missiles might appear to be headed towards targets
in these nations.  The potential for misunderstanding is compounded by the short
time of flight of these missiles, giving these nations little time to evaluate the event,
assess the threat, and respond with their own forces.
There is precedent for the United States to deploy some types of delivery
vehicles with both nuclear and conventional warheads.  For example, U.S. long-range
bombers have always been able to carry conventional weapons and all three of the
current types of nuclear-capable bombers — B-1, B-2, and B-52 — have delivered
conventional weapons during recent conflicts.  In addition, the conventional cruise
missiles carried by the B-52 bomber were initially deployed as nuclear air-launched
cruise missiles and were later (during the early 1990s) converted to carry
conventional weapons.  Unlike ballistic missiles however, bombers can change their
course and return to base if necessary.  Further, the Tomahawk sea-launched cruise
missiles (SLCMs) have always been deployed in both nuclear and conventional
versions.  The United States has often launched the conventional SLCMs during
conflicts and has never experienced misunderstandings about whether these missiles
carried nuclear or conventional warheads.41  But these have never flown over Russia
in pursuit of their targets.
Long-range ballistic missiles with conventional warheads could be viewed with
far more concern than these other dual-capable systems because they were developed
and deployed solely as a part of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent force.  Even if the
United States were to convince other nations that we had deployed some of these
missiles with conventional warheads, they could still question whether the missiles
launched during a conflict carried conventional warheads or whether the United
States had converted them back to carry nuclear warheads.
The launch of land-based long-range ballistic missiles armed with conventional
warheads could present another type of problem for the United States and Canada.
If these missiles were launched from existing ICBM bases in the northern and central
United States, they could drop their rocket motor stages over populated areas of the
United States or Canada.  This may have been considered a small price to pay during
a global nuclear war with the Soviet Union, but it may be far less acceptable within
civilian populations under less trying and catastrophic circumstances.
As was noted above, the Air Force has said it would rename the retired
Minuteman and Peacekeeper missiles as the Minotaur II and Minotaur III missiles if
it deploys them with the conventional warheads or the proposed CAV system.  This
would allow the United States to differentiate between the conventional and nuclear-
armed versions of its ballistic missiles in its operational plans, and possibly help
provide other nations with a means to distinguish between the two.  The Air Force
has also identified a concept of operation for the Minotaur missiles that includes a
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number of “mitigating measures” that might ease concerns about the potential for
misunderstandings and damage arising from their launch.  These factors fall into
three general categories: basing measures; cooperative measures; and operational
measures.
Basing Measures. The Air Force has stated that it would deploy ballistic
missiles armed with CAVs or other conventional warheads for PGS mission at bases
far from missiles armed with nuclear warheads and far from bases with storage
facilities for nuclear warheads.42  The two potential sites include Vandenberg Air
Force base in California and Cape Canaveral in Florida.  According to the Air Force,
“the new coastal basing sites would have no nuclear capability or association”43 as
they would lack the facilities and equipment needed to handle or store nuclear
weapons.  The coastal basing plan would also address concerns about debris from
missile launches falling on populated areas in the United States or Canada.  If the
missiles were launched from the U.S. coast, rather than from bases in northern,
central states, then the debris would likely fall over the oceans rather than over land.
The Air Force has also stated that it could deploy Minotaur missiles on mobile
launchers, horizontally in earthen berms, or above ground, rather than in the
hardened, vertical silos used at nuclear  ICBM bases.  The United States could then
declare, to Russia or other nations, that these new, modified launchers were equipped
with conventional-only delivery vehicles.  This declaration would further
demonstrate that the missiles at the two coastal bases were different from nuclear
ICBMs, even though it would not preclude the possible covert deployment of nuclear
warheads on the missiles.44  Further, their deployment with a CAV reentry vehicle,
rather than a standard post-boost vehicle and warhead present on a nuclear-armed
missile, would reinforce this designation.45 
Cooperative Measures.  The Air Force has proposed that the United States
institute a number of cooperative measures with other nations to add confidence to
the U.S. declaration that the Minotaur missiles deployed at coastal bases would carry
conventional warheads.  These measures could include military-to-military contacts,
high level political consultations, and ongoing discussions to keep Russia and other
nations informed about U.S. plans for these missiles and to make them aware of the
observable differences between conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles.  The Air
Force has referred to this process as a “strategic dialogue” that might, over time,
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answer questions and ease concerns about the plans for and capabilities of long-range
ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads.46  
The United States could also invite other nations to observe test launches of
these missiles or to participate in exercises that include simulations with these
missiles.  This might allow nations such as Russia to become familiar with the
operational procedures associated with ballistic missiles armed with conventional
warheads and to distinguish between these procedures and those associated with
nuclear-armed missiles.  Further, the United States could allow Russia to conduct
short-notice inspections at the Minotaur bases, similar to, or even more intrusive
than, the inspections permitted at nuclear missile bases under the START Treaty, to
confirm the absence of nuclear weapons either on the missiles or in the storage
facilities.47  Over time, these measures would not only provide information about the
missiles and their missions, but might also build confidence and understanding
between the parties. The increased level of cooperation, and possibly decreased level
of suspicion, might then reduce the likelihood of misinterpretation if the United
States were to launch ballistic missiles with conventional warheads.  
The United States could also provide Russia with prior notification of planned
launches of ballistic missiles with conventional warheads, or the two nations could
set up a dedicated “hot line” for use after a launch, so the United States could inform
Russia of the launch and assure it that the missile did not carry a nuclear warhead and
was not headed for targets in Russia.  Further, as has been discussed on many
occasions over the years, the United States and Russia could share early-warning data
at a joint facility so that Russia would have the information it needed to distinguish
between the launch of a nuclear-armed ballistic missile from a northern base and the
launch of a conventional-armed ballistic missile from a coastal base.
Mission Planning and Operational Measures.  The Air Force has also
indicated that it could alter the trajectory of ballistic missiles armed with
conventional warheads so that they would not resemble the trajectories that would
be followed by nuclear-armed ballistic missiles on course for targets in Russia or
China.48  As was noted above, CAV is have the capability to travel 3,000 miles
downrange and 3,000 miles cross-range, after release from its ballistic missile
delivery system.  Hence, according to the Air Force, the missile could travel on a
“shaped trajectory” or, if launched from the East Coast towards the Middle East, a
southern trajectory, so that it would not fly over Russia or China, and make up for the
added distance by using the flight range of the CAV.  The missile could also launch
with a “depressed trajectory,” then use the aerodynamic lift of the CAV to achieve
the range it would need to reach around the globe without flying over Russia.  
Taken together, these three types of measures might help reduce the risks of
misunderstandings.  But the accumulation of information during peacetime and
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frequent communications during crises may not be sufficient address problems that
could come up in an atmosphere of confusion and incomplete information during a
conflict.  Specifically, the argument in favor of using long-range ballistic missiles for
the PGS mission assumes that the United States might have little warning before the
start a conflict and might need to launch its missiles promptly at that time. This
scenario would allow little time for the United States to consult with, or even inform,
other nations about its intentions.  If other nations are caught by surprise and fear
they might be under nuclear attack, they might also decide to respond promptly,
before the United States had the opportunity to convince them that the missiles
carried conventional warheads. 
Further, routine data exchanges and on-site inspections can provide confidence
in the absence of nuclear warheads on the missiles on a day-to-day basis in
peacetime, but they cannot provide assurances that the warheads could not be
changed in a relatively short period of time or that the warheads were not actually
changed in the days or weeks since the last inspection.  In addition, changing the
basing patterns or launch patterns of missiles to draw a sharper distinction between
conventional and nuclear-armed missiles assumes both that other nations can observe
the differences and that they believe the different appearances indicate different
warheads.  Finally, these measures would do nothing to alleviate concerns among
nations that did not participate in the cooperative programs.  As a result, while the
measures described above can reduce the possibility of misunderstandings, they
probably cannot eliminate them.
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles.  The Navy has also considered
the possibility of deploying conventional warheads on some of its long-range
submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).  Although they would be based at
sea, these missiles would share many characteristics of land-based ballistic missiles
that make them suited to the PGS mission.  As nuclear delivery vehicles, they have
been deployed with the command and control systems needed to allow for prompt
decision-making and prompt launch during a crisis.  They have the range to reach
targets around the world and they would have the accuracy, particularly if the reentry
vehicles can receive GPS updates, to attack a wide range of targets on short notice.
Congress has offered modest support for this effort, providing an additional $10
million in the FY2005 Defense Appropriations Act for “Advanced Conventional
Strike Capability Assessment.”  And, as was noted above, the Navy has requested
additional funds for this effort in the FY2007 budget, with funding to total around
$500 million in the next six years.
SLBMs armed with conventional warheads could raise many of the same
questions about misunderstandings as land-based ballistic missiles, particularly if
these warheads are deployed, as press reports indicate, on the same submarines that
currently carry nuclear warheads.  Although the United States could deploy SLBMs
with conventional warheads on submarines that did not carry nuclear warheads, it
would be extremely difficult to demonstrate these differences and assure other
nations of the segregated deployments in a submarine that is intended to be hidden
and invulnerable when at sea.  Further, according to some reports, Russia’s ability
to monitor U.S. SLBM launches is even more degraded than its ability to monitor
ICBM launches, so it might conclude that it is under nuclear attack if it observed an
SLBM launch from a U.S. ballistic missile submarine.  On the other hand, because
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the submarines are mobile and the missiles are long-range, the United States could
operate submarines with conventional SLBMs in areas that are far from potential
targets in Russia (or China) and launch those missiles along trajectories that did not
require them to fly over these nations on their way to their intended targets.  But,
again, reports indicate that the current plan is for the submarines to operate in their
standard “alert boxes” consistent with their nuclear missions.  They could still move
away prior to launching their missiles, but this presumes that the United States had
the time to move its submarines to these new launch points prior to the start of the
conflict, a possibility that is inconsistent with the PGS mission’s assumption that the
United States could need to launch its missiles promptly at the start of an unexpected
conflict.  The plan to deploy Trident missiles with conventional warheads on the
same submarines as missiles with nuclear warheads could also raise questions about
the command and control of those missiles.  At the present time, submarine
commanders can not launch their missiles until they receive authorization from the
National Command Authority (essentially, the President).  It is unclear whether the
missiles with conventional warheads would be subject to the same stringent
command and control processes, or whether someone within the military chain of
command would be able to authorize their use without Presidential approval.
Long-Range Bombers.  U.S. bombers — B-52s, B-2s, and B-1s — have the
range and payload needed to deliver weapons to targets across the globe.  But they
may not be suited to the PGS mission because they could take hours or days to reach
targets in remote areas, and they would require tanker support to refuel during their
missions.  The long flight time could contribute to crew fatigue and air defenses
could deny the bombers access to some critical target areas.  Conventional cruise
missiles delivered by B-52 bombers would allow the aircraft to stay out of the range
of some air-defense systems, but they could still take too long to reach their targets
meet the objectives of the PGS mission.  On the other hand, the long time of flight
could give the United States time to review and resolve the situation without resort
to military attacks.
Tomahawk Cruise Missiles. At the present time, the Navy has the capability
to attack targets at ranges of around 1,500 nautical miles with sea-based cruise
missiles.  These Tomahawk missiles have been employed often in the conflicts in the
past 15 years, providing the United States with the ability to reach targets without
risking aircraft or their crews. The Navy is currently modifying four of its Trident
ballistic missile submarines so that they can carry cruise missiles.  These submarines
are to be equipped to carry up to 7 Tomahawk missiles each in up to 22 (out of 24)
of their Trident launch tubes, for a total of 154 cruise missiles per submarine.  But
these missiles may be limited in their ability to contribute to the PGS mission.  With
a maximum speed of about 550 miles per hour and a range of 1,500 nautical miles
they can take 2-3 hours to reach their targets.  Further, their reach is limited, even if
the ships or submarines carrying the missiles are deployed in the region of the
conflict.  Consequently, the Navy has also explored alternatives that would allow it
to reach its potential targets more quickly. 
Hypersonic Cruise Missiles.  Since the mid-1990s, the Navy has explored
several options for the development and deployment of an attack missile that could
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travel at speeds of Mach 3-Mach 5.49  These hypersonic missiles would allow the
Navy to attack targets within 15 minutes from ships or submarines based within 500-
600 nautical miles of their targets.  Hence, they would provide the capability for
prompt strikes within the theater of operations, but they would not have the range
sought for the PGS mission.  The United States would either need to keep its vessels
on station near potential areas of conflict, which it already does in certain areas, or
it would need days or weeks to move its ships or submarines into place.
Submarine-Launched Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
(SLIRBM). The Navy is also studying the possible development and deployment of
an intermediate-range missile that could be launched from its ballistic missile
submarines.  It requested industry participation in the study in mid-2003, and plans
to conduct two static test-firings of a prototype rocket engine in 2005.50  According
to the Defense Science Board Task Force, this missile might deliver a 2,000 pound
payload over a 1,500 mile range,51 with an accuracy of less than 5 meters.  This
would allow the missile to reach its target in less than 15 minutes.52  Reports indicate
that this proposed missile could carry either nuclear or conventional warheads,
allowing it to contribute to the missions requiring prompt, long-range strike
capabilities.53  These missiles could also be deployed on the modified Trident
submarines, with up to 3 missiles each in up to 22 of the submarine’s launch tubes,
for a total of 66 missiles per submarine.  
The proposed submarine-launched intermediate range ballistic missile would
achieve many of the objectives necessary for the PGS mission.  It could attack targets
quickly, both at the start of a conflict if the submarines were within range, and during
the conflict if new targets emerged.  Its speed and angle of attack might also make
it capable of attacking some types of hardened or buried targets.  It would also be
able to penetrate an adversary’s defenses without putting aircraft or crews at risk.
Further, by launching from submarines based close to the theater of conflict, these
missiles  might avoid some of the overflight problems that would occur if a ballistic
missile launched from the continental United States.  It would not eliminate all
possibilities of misunderstanding, however, because nations observing the launch
might not be able to tell whether the missiles carried nuclear or conventional
warheads, and, with the short time-of-flight, they might decide to assume the worst.
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Arms Control Issues
The Air Force has acknowledged that “depending on system design” long-range
ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads could be covered by the
provisions in the 1991 START Treaty.54  This treaty limits the United States to a total
of 4,900 “attributed” warheads on its land-based and sea-based long-range ballistic
missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs).  The number of warheads attributed to each type of
missile is outlined in a memorandum of understanding that accompanies the treaty.
The Minuteman II missile, which would serve as the base for the Minotaur II missile,
is counted as carrying one warhead; the Peacekeeper, which could become the
Minotaur III missile, is counted as carrying 10 warheads.  
The treaty specifies that all ICBM launchers and submarine launch tubes that
can hold ballistic missiles covered by the treaty will count against the treaty limits.
This would  presumably include launchers for Minotaur missiles.  However, even if
the Minotaur missiles count against the START limits as if they were still
Minuteman II or Peacekeeper missiles, it is unlikely that the United States would
exceed the START limit of 4,900 warheads.  This is because the United States plans
to reduce its warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 “operationally deployed
warheads”, as it is required to do under the 2002 Moscow Treaty between the United
States and Russia.  These deeper reductions warheads on nuclear-armed ballistic
missiles will mean that the United States has the “room” to deploy missiles with
conventional warheads without exceeding START limits.  The United States would
not have to count missiles with conventional warheads against the limits in the 2003
Moscow Treaty if it excludes these systems from its definition of  “operationally
deployed warheads.”55
The START Treaty may, nonetheless, impinge on the Air Force plan to deploy
ballistic missiles with conventional warheads at coastal bases.  The treaty indicates
that new types of ICBMs, or modified versions of existing ICBMs, must be deployed
at ICBM bases in rail-mobile, road-mobile, or silo launchers.56  The United States
could declare Vandenberg to be a new ICBM base, but it would have to build new
silos, or use mobile launchers for the missiles.  The treaty does allow the parties to
locate “soft-site” launchers for ICBMs at test ranges or space launch facilities, which
would include Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral.57  But the treaty states that the
parties cannot flight test ICBMs equipped with reentry vehicles from space-launch
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facilities, which would seem to preclude deployment at Cape Canaveral.58  The treaty
further limits the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at test facilities
(which would include Vandenberg) to 25 and the aggregate number of test launchers
to 20.59  The United States has already declared that it has 15 test launchers at
Vandenberg, leaving little room for the deployment of additional launchers for
ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads.
The START Treaty also allows on-site inspections at bases housing delivery
vehicles limited by the treaty, notifications prior to the launch of missiles limited by
the treaty, and the provision of telemetry generated during test flights of missiles
limited by the treaty.  These provisions could all apply to the new Minotaur missiles,
even if they are deployed with conventional warheads far from bases that house
nuclear warheads or nuclear delivery vehicles.  These provisions, particularly those
calling for prior notification of missile launches, could help the United States inform
Russia or other nations of its intentions when it decides to use a Minotaur missile in
a conflict.  On the other hand, these provisions could also complicate U.S. efforts to
launch these missiles promptly at the start of a sudden, unexpected conflict. 
The United States could claim that, because the Minotaur missiles were
deployed with conventional warheads, they should not count under START or be
subject to the deployment restrictions and data exchange provisions in the Treaty.
However, it is likely that the United States would have to meet with Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan, the four former Soviet states that are parties to the Treaty
to work out how the provisions of the Treaty are to apply to these missiles.
Regardless, the relationship between these missiles and U.S. arms control
obligations, along with Russia’s possible reaction to U.S. proposals to either apply
or avoid these obligations for the new Minotaur missiles, deserves further analysis.
The Navy has not yet addressed, publicly, arms control questions that might
arise from the deployment of conventional warheads on its Trident missiles.  Many
of the issues discussed above for the Air Force stem from the plan to segregate
missiles with conventional warheads from those with nuclear warheads, and to have
those with conventional warheads recognized as different missiles.  Because the
Navy plans appear to call for the deployment of missiles with conventional and
nuclear warheads on the same submarines, the Navy would not have similar
concerns.  It would be highly unlikely for the United States to suggest or for Russia
to accept that these missiles should not count as nuclear-armed missiles under the
START Treaty or the Moscow Treaty.  In addition, the missiles are likely to be
subject to the same reentry vehicle inspections as nuclear missiles, and, therefore, the
Navy would have to be prepared to demonstrate that these missiles do not carry more
than the declared number of warheads.  This is not likely to be a problem under
current plans, as the nuclear missiles are declared to carry six or eight warheads, and
the new plan calls for deploying the conventional missiles with only four warheads.
However, if the United States does have to count the warheads on these missiles
under their totals in the START Treaty or the Moscow Treaty, it could have to alter
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its nuclear targeting plans to accommodate a reduction in the actual number of
nuclear warheads available for use in a conflict. 
Weighing the Benefits and Risks
The Air Force, and many analysts outside government, have argued that long-
range land-based ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads can provide
a low-cost, near-term solution to the meet the demands of the prompt global strike
mission.  They have demonstrated, during their many years on alert during the Cold
War, that they have high levels of reliability and readiness, along with a robust and
responsive command and control structure.  They were also designed to perform with
and a great degree of accuracy, which may improve in the future if they are deployed
with new guidance technologies.  Many experts argue that these characteristics are
invaluable for a long-range conventional strike system in the post-Cold War era.
But these weapons might provide the United States with more capability than
it needs under most circumstances, while, at the same time, raising the possibility that
their use might be misinterpreted as the launch of nuclear weapons.  For example,
as would be true for any weapon seeking to achieve this mission, the ability to attack
targets across the globe on short notice depends on the U.S. ability to acquire precise
information about the locations of potential targets and to translate that information
into useful targeting data.  If it takes longer for the United States to acquire and use
that information than it would take for it to launch and deliver a ballistic missile, or,
as has often been the case, if such precise information is unavailable, then the United
States may not be able to benefit from the unique characteristics of long-range
ballistic missiles.  Bombers would take longer to reach their targets, but this added
time might provide the United States with the opportunity to acquire the needed
intelligence.
In addition, long-range ballistic missiles would have an advantage over sea-
based systems if the United States did not have naval forces near the conflict region,
or did not have time to move these forces to the area, or if the target area were out of
range for the sea-based systems.  But the U.S. Navy deploys its force around the
world and maintains capabilities near likely areas of conflict.  A few targets may be
out of range for these weapons, but bombers armed with cruise missiles might be
able to reach them.  Land-based long-range ballistic missiles would only be needed
in the rare circumstance where the United States had no warning, needed a prompt
attack, and had to reach too far inland for sea-based systems.  But even in these
circumstances, the benefits of the use of long-range ballistic missiles might not
outweigh the risks.
Most analysts recognized, during the Cold War, that long-range land-based
ballistic missiles could prove destabilizing in a crisis, when nations might have
incomplete information about the nature of an attack, and too little time to gather
more information and plan an appropriate response.  Faced with these circumstances,
a nation who was not an intended target, such as Russia, might choose to respond
quickly, rather than to wait for more information.  The same could be true for the
adversaries who are the intended targets of U.S. ballistic missiles.  If the United
States hoped to destroy a nation’s military forces or weapons of mass destruction at
the start of a conflict, before they could be used against U.S. troops, the other nation
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might choose to use these weapons even more quickly during a crisis, before it lost
them to the U.S. attack.
Some have argued that the possible crisis instabilities associated with long-range
ballistic missiles should not eliminate them from consideration for the PGS mission
because the United States can work with Russia, China, and other nations to reduce
the risks and because no other weapons, at least in the short term, provide the United
States with the ability to attack promptly anywhere on the globe, at the start of an
unexpected conflict.  Yet the question of whether the United States should accept the
risks associated with the potential for misunderstandings and crisis instabilities can
be viewed with a broader perspective.  How likely is the United States to face the
need to attack quickly at great distances at the start of an unexpected conflict?  How
much would the United States lose if it had to wait a few hours or days to move its
forces into the region (or to await the intelligence reports and precise targeting data
needed for an attack)?  
If the risks of waiting for bombers or sea-based weapons to arrive in the theater
are high, then long-range ballistic missiles may be the preferred response, even with
the risk that other nations might misunderstanding U.S. intentions.  On the other
hand, if the risks of waiting for other forces to arrive in theater are deemed to be
manageable, and the risks of potential misunderstandings and crisis instabilities
associated with the launch of long-range ballistic missiles are thought to be high, then
the United States can consider a broader range of alternative weapons systems to
meet the needs of the PGS mission. 
